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THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS:
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO ACADEMIC
DECISION-MAKERS
The Conflict In Higher Education Between
Fundamental Program Requirements and Reasonable
Accommodations Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
and The Americans With Disabilities Act
by Douglas K. Rush
PROLOGUE'
'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said in rather a
scornful tone, 'it means just what I choose it to mean -
neither more or less.'
'The question is,' said Alice, 'whether you can make words
mean so many different things.'
'The question is,' said Humpty Dumpty, 'which is to be
master - that's all.'
2
Lewis Carroll, English author & mathematician (1832 -
1898)
INTRODUCTION
Lewis Carroll's "Through The Looking Glass: and What Alice Found There"
3
introduces us to Alice's dream-induced fantasy world in her search for passage from
. Assistant Dean for Evening Programs and Disability Accommodation Coordinator, Saint Louis University
School of Law. I am especially grateful for the input, suggestions and corrections provided by my wife,
Janette M. Lohman, J.D., L.L.M. and for the support, review and editorial advice provided by Assistant
Professor Nicole Porter, Saint Louis University School of Law.
1 "[A]n introductory speech, often in verse, calling attention to the theme of the play." THE AMERICAN
COLLEGE DICTIONARY 969 (1948).
2 LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 171
(Schocken Books 1979) (1872).
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Victorian adolescence to adulthood. This novel, together with its predecessor, "Alice in
Wonderland, '4 has been analyzed by legions of undergraduate and graduate students and
their faculty who have divined undertones as diverse as awakening sexual liberation and
feminism to rebellion from Victorian moral absolutism.
5
The author's reading of the novel and review of this commentary suggest that
Alice's fall through the looking glass led her to a world where she is a pawn and her
every move is governed by the strict rules of a chess game. The looking glass world is
devoid of moral principle. The Red Queen rules through decree, with little regard for any
logical support of her mandates. The rule of law does not exist. The Queen's arbitrary
demands are based solely upon her authority for their justification. In this dream world,
reality is a mirror image; nothing can be trusted. The characters who Alice meets are not
real, do not show human compassion and do not provide guidance through the chess
board world. Alice is saved only when the kindly White Knight defeats the Red Queen's
Knight and leads her through the forest to the chess board's eighth square where she
becomes a queen and then awakes from her dream.
6
Learning disabled students in institutions of higher education, at times, must feel
as if they have fallen through the looking glass into Alice's dream world. Like Carroll's
Red Queen, many academic decision-makers are increasingly erecting barriers to such
students' participation in programs of higher education based on little more than their
3 LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE (Peter Piper Press ed.,
The MacMillan Company 1940) (1899), available at http://etext.virginia.edu/etcbin/toccer-
new2?id-CarGlas.sgm&images-images/modeng&data-/texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag-public&part-al
1.
4 CARROLL, supra note 2.
' A web search reveals hundreds of thousands of links to articles, reviews and treatises analyzing the
subject. Without attempting to list all such sources, the author would suggest that the reader do a web
search for "Through The Looking Glass" if he or she is interested in an exhaustive and exhausting study of
this issue.
6 See CARROLL, supra note 2.
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arbitrary authority. Congress' intent to eliminate disability discrimination in higher
education is being thwarted by administrators who, like Humpty Dumpty, place their own
meaning on words contained in legislative mandates. The courts are increasingly
abdicating their responsibility under the doctrine of deference to those decision-makers.
Where are the White Knights to lead these students back to a world in which human
compassion and moral principles trump arbitrary academic dictates? It is hoped that the
readers of this article will gain a different perspective of these issues, a perspective based
on the belief that students with learning disabilities can, and do, succeed in higher
education where they are guided by White Knight administrators rather than Red
Queens. 7
The right of institutions of higher education to make independent admissions
decisions has been noted as one of the four fundamental academic freedoms under the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.8 By enacting Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 19739 (hereinafter "Section 504") and the Americans With
Disabilities Act'0 (hereinafter "the ADA"), Congress also recognized that it is in the
national interest to protect the rights of disabled individuals and to ensure that those
persons are judged on their abilities and not on the basis of their real or perceived
disabilities. 11
The right of disabled persons to participate in higher education programs can
cause inevitable conflicts when academic decision-makers weigh fundamental program
7 My apologies for the "Through the Looking Glass" construct. I admit that it is not original and has
become, possibly, trite. Nevertheless, to the extent that it stimulates readers to consider these issues it may
serve a useful purpose.
' Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985) (citing Univ. of Cal. Regents v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (internal citations omitted)).
9 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2005).
0 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2005).
" See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(8), 12102(2) (2000).
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requirements against the need to modify programs to accommodate individual
disabilities. Issues of academic freedom, including the selection of student participants,
course content, testing policy and graduation requirements, among others, may clash with
Congressional mandates that prohibit discrimination against individuals with physical,
mental or learning disabilities.
Recent court decisions demonstrate that courts give great deference to academic
decision-makers, particularly where learning, cognitive or psychological disabilities are
concerned. Academic and other institutions are placing an increasingly greater burden on
students to document and prove the existence of learning disabilities and their need for
academic accommodation. 12 Furthermore, the recent trend in court decisions is to
measure the extent of an individual's learning or cognitive disability against the academic
ability of the general population.13 Students with superior IQ test scores who have
documented learning disabilities are being denied academic accommodations where their
intellectual capacity is equal to or exceeds that of the general population. 14 Those
disabled students are often prevented from succeeding in graduate level education
12 See, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES, MCAT DISABILITIES ACCOMMODATIONS
(2003), http://www.aamc.org/students/mcat/about/ada2003.pdf (for determining whether to grant
accommodations on the Medical College Admissions Test); ASSOCIATION ON HIGHER EDUCATION AND
DISABILITY, GUIDELINES FOR DOCUMENTATION OF A LEARNING DISABILITY IN ADOLESCENTS AND ADULTS
(1997), http://www.Idonline.org/ Id indepth/postsecondary/ahead guidelines.html; CONSORTIUM ON
ADHD DOCUMENTATION, ATTENTION DEFICIT/HYPERACTIVITY DISORDER IN ADOLESCENTS AND ADULTS
(2003), http://www.learningsupportservices.villanova.edu/attention deficit.htm; LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION
COUNCIL, INC., GUIDELINES FOR DOCUMENTATION OF COGNITIVE DISABILITIES (2005),
http://www.1sac.org/pdfs/2005-2006/GuidelinesCognitive-2005.pdf (for determining whether to grant
accommodations on the Law School Admissions Test).
13 See, e.g., Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 970 F. Supp. 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (comparing bar
examination applicant's reading ability to that of the average college student in determining whether
applicant was disabled under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act); Gonzales v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs,
225 F.3d 620 (6th Cir. 2000) (comparing medical student's reading and writing abilities to those of the
"average student").
14 See, e.g., Baer v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 392 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D. Mass. 2005) (holding that medical
student was not entitled to extended time for taking the United States Medical Licensing Examination, and
pointing out that the plaintiff had very high IQ scores).
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programs where simple accommodations, such as increased time on tests or the use of
computers, could allow them to successfully complete their programs. The current
rationale of many courts is that such students may suffer from a learning disability but
they are not disabled within the meaning of Section 504 and the ADA because their
impairment level still results in an academic ability which matches or exceeds the general
population as a whole, 15 even though the general population is incapable of completing
graduate level academic programs. The trend toward evaluating learning disabled
students by comparing them to the population as a whole may result in many superior
students being prevented from fulfilling their educational goals, and may deny disabled
students the opportunity to achieve their career potential.
This paper will review the statutory mandates of Section 504 and the ADA and
examine the extent to which courts are willing to defer to institutional decisions
concerning program modifications to accommodate learning disabled students. Courts
have long recognized that academic decision-makers are entitled to deference, especially
when their decisions concern issues related to educational programs. 16 Courts must be
vigilant, however, to properly weigh their role as the enforcers of Congressional
legislation against the judicial policy of deference to academic decisions.
Section I of this article will review the federal statutory and regulatory
frameworks governing disability accommodations as they relate to institutions of higher
education. Section II will address the potential conflict between essential program
requirements in higher education and compliance with federal mandates. Section III will
consider the federal courts' deference to academic decision-makers, particularly with
15 See, e.g., supra note 13.
16 See Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978).
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regard to granting or denying academic accommodations for persons with disabilities.
Finally, Section IV will examine two cases that demonstrate the limits of the federal
courts' deference to academic decision-makers.
I.
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AS THEY APPLY TO
INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION
There was a book lying near Alice on the table, and while she sat
watching the White King... she turned over the leaves, to find some
part that she could read, '- for it's all in some language I don't
know,' she said to herself....
She puzzled over this for some time, but at last a bright thought
struck her. 'Why, it's a Looking-glass book, of course! And if I hold
it up to a glass, the words will all go the right way again .... '
'It seems very pretty,' she said when she had finished it, 'but it's
rather hard to understand!' (You see she didn't like to confess, even
to herself, that she couldn't make it out at all.) 'Somehow it seems to
fill my head with ideas - only I don't exactly know what they are!' 
17
A. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197318 was intended to prevent
discrimination against handicapped individuals by any program which receives federal
funds. 19 The Act states in part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability21 in the
United States, as defined in section 7(20) [29 U.S.C. §
705(20)], shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be
17 CARROLL, supra note 2, at 118, 120, 123.
18 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2005).
19 See LeStrang v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 687 F.2d 767 (3d Cir. 1982).
20 Section 504 of The Rehabilitation Act as originally drafted used the term "handicapped individual." It
was amended to substitute the term "individual with a disability." The Rehabilitation Act, Pub. L. No. 102-
569, 106 Stat. 4348 (1992). The substitution was to make the terminology of the Rehabilitation Act
consistent with the terminology of the Americans With Disabilities Act. It was not Congress' intent to
change the meaning of the Act. 138 CONG. REC. 22900 (daily ed. Aug. 12, 1992).
Winter 2006
Richmond Journal of Law and the Public Interest
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance or under any
program or activity conducted by any Executive agency or
by the United States Postal Service.
21
A plaintiff who wishes to establish a violation of Section 504 must prove that she
meets four elements: (1) that she is an individual with a disability; (2) that "she is
otherwise qualified for participation in the program;" (3) that "the program receives
federal financial assistance;" and (4) that "she was denied the benefits of' or "subject to
discrimination" under the program.22
Section 504 defines the term disability as "a physical or mental impairment that
constitutes or results in a substantial impediment to employment; or... a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities." 23 An
individual with a disability is defined as any person who has (i) "a physical or mental
impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person's major life activities";
(ii) "has a record of such an impairment"; or (iii) "is regarded as having such an
impairment." 24 The term "major life activities" is defined in the implementing
regulations as "functions such as caring for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 25 The definition of
"program" includes "a college, university, or other postsecondary institution, or a public
21 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2005).
22 Nathanson v. The Med. Coll. of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1380 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing Strathie v. Dep't of
Transp., 716 F.2d 227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983) (internal quotations omitted)); Doherty v. S. Coll. of Optometry,
862 F.2d 570, 573 (6th Cir. 1988).
23 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(A), (B) (1998).
24 Id. § 705(20)(B)(i)-(iii).
25 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2005).
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system of higher education. '26 Section 504 specifically authorizes federal agencies to
issue regulations to carry out the purpose of the Act.
2 7
Section 504 also requires that a person who brings a claim prove that she was
subject to discrimination "solely" because of her disability. 28 A disabled individual
cannot establish a claim under Section 504 if she is unable to meet a facially-neutral
program requirement, unless she "can establish ... that the requirement was merely a
pretext for unlawful discrimination.
'
"
29
Implementing regulations prohibit educational institutions that receive federal
financial aid from denying "a qualified handicapped person the opportunity to participate
in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service." 30 A "qualified handicapped person" with
respect to post-secondary or higher education is "a handicapped person who meets the
academic and technical standards requisite to admission or participation in the recipient's
education program or activity."
31
In the admissions and recruitment of potential higher education students, an
educational institution that receives federal financial aid may not deny handicapped
persons admission to a program based on handicap. 2 A program may not impose limits
on the number of handicapped individuals that it may admit,33 and a program cannot use
26 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(2)(A) (2005); 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(k)(2)(i) (2005).
27 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2005).
28 id.
29 Murphy v. Franklin Pierce Law Ctr., 882 F. Supp. 1176, 1181 (D.N.H. 1994) (internal citations omitted)
30 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(b)(i) (2004). As noted supra note 20, Section 504 was amended to substitute the term
"individual with a disability" for the term "handicapped individual." Regulations issued by various
agencies may not have been amended and may still utilize the term "handicapped person." The author has
used the terminology in the current version of the regulations in the body of this paper.
31 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(l)(3) (2004).
32 Id. § 104.42(a).
3 Id. § 104.42(b)(1).
Winter 2006
Richmond Journal of Law and the Public Interest
any test or criterion for admission which has a disparate impact on such individuals. 34
Furthermore, a program cannot make any preadmission inquiry about whether the
applicant suffers from a handicap.
35
Once a handicapped student is admitted into an educational program, the student
may not be subject to discrimination. 36 The program cannot exclude any handicapped
student from "any course, course of study, or other part of its education program or
activity" 37 and must operate its program "in the most integrated setting appropriate.
'
"
38
The implementing regulations also require that such a program:
make such modifications to its academic requirements as
are necessary to ensure that such requirements do not
discriminate or have the effect of discriminating, on the
basis of handicap, against a qualified handicapped applicant
or student. Academic requirements that the recipient can
demonstrate are essential to the instruction being pursued
by such student or to any directly related licensing
requirement will not be regarded as discriminatory within
the meaning of this section. Modifications may include
changes in the length of time permitted for the completion
of degree requirements, substitution of specific courses
required for completion of degree requirements, and
adaptation of the manner in which specific courses are
conducted.39
Educational programs subject to Section 504 must provide methods of evaluating
a handicapped student's performance which measure the student's educational
achievement rather than reflect the student's impairment. Programs must also provide
handicapped students with auxiliary aids which may include taped texts, interpreters,
readers for students with visual impairments, adapted classrooms for students with
341d. § 104.42(b)(2).
35 Id. § 104.42(b)(4).
36Id. § 104.43(a).
37Id. § 104.43(c).
381d. § 104.43(d).
39 Id. § 104.44(a).
40 Id. § 104.44(c).
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manual impairments, and other similar services and aids.41 Such programs, however, are
not required to "provide attendants, individually prescribed devices, readers for personal
use or study, or other devices or services of a personal nature."
42
B. The Americans With Disabilities Act
In 1991, the United States Congress enacted the Americans With Disabilities
Act,43 noting that at the time there are over 43,000,000 persons with disabilities living in
the United States. 44 Congress further noted that society tended to isolate and discriminate
against these individuals in critical areas including education.45 Unlike those suffering
from race or sex discrimination, Congress observed, individuals suffering from
discrimination due to physical or mental disabilities often had no legal recourse.46
Congress determined that "the Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with
disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, independent living,
and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals..."
47
Accordingly, Congress enacted the ADA:
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities;
(2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable
standards addressing discrimination against individuals
with disabilities;
(3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a central
role in enforcing the standards established in this chapter
on behalf of individuals with disabilities; and
(4) to invoke the sweep of congressional authority,
including the power to enforce the fourteenth amendment
and to regulate commerce, in order to address the major
4 1 id. § 104.44(d)(2).
42 Id.
43 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2005).
44 [d. § 12101(a).
45 Id. § 12101(a)(2)-(3).
46 Id. § 12101 (a)(4).
47 1d. § 12101(a)(8).
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areas of discrimination faced day-to-day by people with
disabilities.48
The ADA is divided into four Subchapters. Subchapter I concerns disability
discrimination in employment. 49 Subchapter II prohibits discrimination based on
disability in public programs, services and benefits.50 Subchapter III prohibits
discrimination based on disability in the area of public accommodations. 51 Subchapter IV
contains miscellaneous provisions. 52 This paper will focus on Subchapters II and III
(hereinafter "Title II" and "Title III") as they have been applied to accommodation
requests in institutions of higher education.
The ADA defines "disability" as:
with respect to an individual-
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 53
Title II of the ADA provides that:
Subject to the provisions of this subchapter, no qualified
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied
the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity. 5
4
Title II defines "public entity" to include: "(A) any State or local government; (B)
any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or
481d. § 12101(b).
49 [d. §§ 12111-12117.
50 [d. §§ 12131-12165.
51
id. §§ 12181-12189.
52 [d. §§ 12201-12213.
5 Id. § 12102(2).
5 4 Id. § 12132.
Winter 2006
Richmond Journal of Law and the Public Interest
States or local government..."5 Title II's prohibition against discrimination extends to
public colleges and universities.
5 6
Pursuant to Title II, a "qualified individual with a disability" is one:
who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules,
policies, or practices, the removal of architectural,
communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision
of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility
requirements for the receipt of services or the participation
in programs or activities provided by a public entity.
5 7
Title II of the ADA adopted the remedies and procedures of the Rehabilitation
58Act. Title II authorizes the Attorney General to promulgate regulations to implement
this section, except in areas covered by the Department of Transportation, and requires
the Attorney General to make his regulations consistent with the regulations of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare. 59
Title III of the ADA extends the prohibition of discrimination against people with
disabilities to places of public accommodation, 60 to include private undergraduate and
post-graduate educational programs. 61 Title III prohibits the use of eligibility criteria that
either discriminate or tend to screen out individuals with disabilities, 62 and further
requires:
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or
procedures, when such modifications are necessary to
afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations to individuals with
disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that making
such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of
55 Id. § 12131(1).
56 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(k)(2)(i) (2005).
57 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2000).
581d. § 12133.
59Id. § 12134(b).
6 0 [d. § 12182(a).
61 Id. § 12181(7)(J).
62 Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i).
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such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations.
63
The Department of Justice has adopted regulations to implement Congress'
mandate in the ADA to eliminate discrimination against disabled individuals. 64 Testing
must be done in a manner which accurately reflects a person's aptitude or achievement
level rather than being reflective of her disability.65 Institutions are not required to permit
a disabled individual to participate in a program if her participation "poses a direct threat
to the health or safety of others.' 66 Institutions, however, are required to make an
individualized assessment to determine whether the nature, duration and severity of the
condition, when weighed against the potential injury and reasonable modifications of
policies which would mitigate the risk, justify exclusion of the individual from the
program. 67 This issue has arisen in cases involving admissions decisions concerning
individuals with communicable diseases.
68
An individual claiming the ADA's protection must also prove that she suffers
from a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of [her]
major life activities...." 69 Department of Justice regulations further define disability to
include: "any mental or psychological disorder such as ... specific learning disabilities."' 70
63 Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii).
64 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.101-36.608 (2005).
65 Id. § 36.309; Rothberg v. Law Sch. Admission Council, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1093 (D. Col. 2004).
66 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(a) (2004).
67 Id. § 36.208(c).
68 See, e.g., Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987) (holding that a school district could
fire a teacher who had suffered a relapse of active tuberculosis if no reasonable accommodations would
prevent her from being a danger to her students).
69 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000).
70 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(3)(i)(B) (2004).
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Accordingly, it has been held that a person who is claiming the protection of the ADA by
reason of a learning disability must present proof of a "specific learning disability."
71
A critical issue which occurs in ADA claims in academic settings is the question
of what constitutes a "specific learning disability." 72 A person who has been diagnosed
with a learning disability is not necessarily "disabled" as that term is defined by the
ADA.73
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered this issue in
Betts v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia.74 Betts had been admitted to
the University's Medical Academic Advanced Post-Baccalaureate ("MAPP") program
for economically disadvantaged or minority students. 75 Students who completed the
program with a minimum 2.75 grade point average were guaranteed admission to the
University of Virginia School of Medicine. 76 Betts had earned a 2.2 GPA in his first
semester of the program and he continued into the second semester on academic
probation.77 He was tested for learning disabilities and was determined to have difficulty
with short term memory and reading speed, although he was noted to have "average
intellectual ability.
' 78
Betts received extra time to complete his second semester exams and earned a 3.5
grade point average. 79 However, he had already taken some second semester exams
71 Argen v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 860 F. Supp. 84, 87 (W.D.N.Y. 1994).
72 id.
73 Betts v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., No. 97-1850, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23105, at * 15 (4th
Cir. Sept. 22, 1999).
74 Id.
75 Id. at *3.
76 [d.
77 Id.
78 id.
79 Betts, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23105, at *4.
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without accommodations which reduced his overall grade point average to a 2.53." He
was then refused admission to the medical school. 81
Betts filed suit alleging a violation of Section 504 and the ADA.82 The District
Court granted summary judgment for the University, finding that Betts was not
"disabled," as that term is construed under the ADA.
83
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit stated that the analysis of whether a person with a
learning disability was "disabled" for ADA purposes did not end with the diagnosis of the
learning disability.84 Courts must further determine whether the learning disability
"substantially limits" at least one major life activity as required by the ADA. 85 Learning
is considered a "major life activity." 86 Thus, the issue became how to construe the
"substantially limits" clause, 87 which is not defined within ADA.88
The United States Supreme Court has held that when Congress does not expressly
define a term, courts should "normally construe it in accord with its ordinary or natural
meaning." 89 The Betts court noted that to carry out the mandate of Title I, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (hereinafter "EEOC") had issued regulations
which defined the same term.9 ° The EEOC's defines "substantially limits" to mean that a
person is:
(i) [u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform; or
'0 Id. at *4-5.
81 id.
82 Id. at * I
83 Id. at *7.
841d. at *15.
5 d. at *16 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000)).
86 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2004).
87 Betts, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23105, at * 16.
88 [d.
89 Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228 (1993).
90 Betts, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS, at *18.
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(ii) [s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or
duration under which an individual can perform a particular
major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or
duration under which the general population can perform
that same major life activity. 9 1
The Betts Court held that when "learning" is the "major life activity," a person is
not disabled "unless his ability to learn is significantly restricted., 92 Accordingly, the
Court concluded that this determination required a comparison of the "learning
disability" of the person alleging discrimination to the learning ability of most people in
the general population.93 The Betts Court provided a specific example of such a
comparison:
Student A has average intellectual capability and an
impairment (dyslexia) that limits his ability to learn so that he
can only learn as well as ten percent of the population. His
ability to learn is substantially impaired because it is limited
in comparison to most people. Therefore, Student A has a
disability for purposes of the ADA. By contrast, Student B
has superior intellectual capability, but her impairment
(dyslexia) limits her ability so that she can learn as well as
the average person. Her dyslexia qualifies as an impairment.
However, Student B's impairment does not substantially limit
the major life function of learning, because it does not restrict
her ability to learn as compared with most people. Therefore,
Student B is not a person with a disability for purposes of the
ADA.94
Under this analysis, the Court found that while Betts had a learning disability, he
was not "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA because his learning ability exceeded
the learning ability of the general population.
95
9 Id. at *18 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (1998)).
92 [d. at * 19.
93 Id.
94 Id. at *19-20 (citing, Price v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 966 F. Supp. 419, 427 (S.D.W.Va. 1997)).
95 Id. at *20. However, the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of the University because it found that Betts was "regarded as having an impairment" since the University
granted testing and course accommodations to Betts.
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A similar result was reached in the case of Spychalsky v. Sullivan.96 Spychalsky
had been tested for learning disabilities when he was in high school. 97 The testing
determined that his overall intelligence was within the high average range; his verbal
ability was in the lower superior range; and his non-verbal ability was in the lower limits
of the high average range. 98 He also tested in the high average range in abstract
conceptualization and mathematic ability. 99 The tester found borderline achievement on
tests which measure "passive auditory attention," "short term memory" and "mental
visual tracking,"'1 and concluded that the findings may indicate either a "lack of effort
on the tasks" or a "genuine deficiency in attention skills."''
1 1
After graduation from high school, Spychalsky attended Boston College where he
requested no accommodations. 102 He graduated in 1995 and took the Law School
Admission Test (LSAT) without accommodations. 0 3 Spychalsky applied for and was
granted admission to St. John's University School of Law in 1997.104 Once admitted, he
requested testing accommodations. 10 5 St. John's referred him for an additional evaluation
which revealed that he tested at the 91 s' percentile in overall intellectual ability, placing
him in the superior range. 106 However, the tester noted that he had weaknesses in
spelling, where he tested at the borderline level. 1
07
96 Spychalsky v. Sullivan, No. CV 01-0958, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15704 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2003).
97 Id. at *2.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id. at *3.
101 Id.
102 Spychalsky, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15704, at *5.
103 Id. at *5-6.
104 Id. at *6.
105 Id.
106 Id. at *7.
107 Id.
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The tester recommended that Spychalsky not have spelling errors adversely affect
his grades, that professors be notified not to penalize him for spelling errors, and that he
should either type his exams with a computer with a spell checking feature or that he be
allowed to dictate his exams and have a scribe write them out and correct his spelling.1
0 8
The Law School granted these accommodations. 0 9 In 1998, Spychalsky requested that
the Law School grant him "time and a half' to take his exams and again the Law School
granted this accommodation. 110
In October 2000, the Law School Registrar sent Spychalsky a note indicating that
he had not completed the course in Taxation which was a requirement for graduation.
Spychalsky requested a waiver of that requirement due to his disability which
"significant ly] affect[ed] [his] ability to manipulate numbers." 112 Sullivan, a Dean at the
Law School, referred the request to Dean Furlong, who denied his request because the
Taxation course was considered a core component of the curriculum.113 Her decision was
reviewed by the Dean of the Law School and by members of the faculty who taught
Taxation. 114 The decision was also reviewed by the Director of the University's
Counseling Center. 115 Following this review, Spychalsky's request for a waiver of the
Taxation requirement was denied. 116 Spychalsky then filed suit claiming a violation of
Title II of the ADA."
17
'0 Spychalsky, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15704, at *8.
109 Id.
110 Id.
... Id. at *8-9.
112 Id. at *9.
113 Id. at *9-10.
114 Spychalsky, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15704, at * 10.
115 Id.
116 id.
117 Id. at 11. The Court noted that the Title I1 claim failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted
because Title I1 applied to public entities. St. John's, as a private university, was not subject to suit under
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Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment raising the issue that
Spychalsky was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA." 8 The Court noted that the
United States Supreme Court held in Toyota Motor Manufacturing Kentucky Inc. v.
Williams119 that merely submitting evidence of a diagnosis of a disability was insufficient
to state a claim under the ADA. 12 Instead, claimants must offer "evidence that the extent
of the limitation [caused by their impairment] in terms of their own experience... is
substantial.,' 121 The District Court then noted that Spychalsky had failed to present
evidence which indicated that his impairment substantially limited the major life
activities of reading or speaking.122 Spychalsky had graduated from high school, a
prestigious university, and a top-ranked law school.123 The Court further noted that
Spychalsky's testing rated him superior in overall intellect and in the superior or high
average range on most tests.124 The District Court concluded that "[lt]his evidence,
evaluated collectively, is insufficient to allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that
Plaintiff was substantially limited in his ability to speak.' 25 The District Court held that
"evidence of certain accommodations in high school and college 'do not suffice to
establish a record that his impairment created a substantial limitation of his ability to
Title 1I. Nevertheless, the Court considered the claim under Title III of the ADA which applied to providers
of public accommodations including private universities.
118 Id. at 12.
119 Toyota Motors Mfg. Ky. Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002).
120 Spychalsky, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *20-21.
121 Toyota Motors, 534 U.S. at 198 (quoting Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999)).
122 Spychalsky, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *24-25.
123 Id. at *24. While the case was pending, Spychalsky took and passed the Taxation course and was
awarded his law degree.
124 Id. at *23.
125 Id. at *25.
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learn, read, or speak.''42 6 Accordingly, the District Court granted the Defendants' motion
for summary judgment. 127
C. Harmonizing the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA
Some courts have held that the elements of a claim under Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act are "identical" to those under the ADA.128 Other courts have noted
that Title II of the ADA was "expressly modeled" on Section 504.129 Furthermore, it has
been noted that "there is no significant difference in analysis of the rights and obligations
created by the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act."' 130 "[C]ourts are required to 'construe
the ADA to grant at least as much protection as provided by the regulations implementing
the Rehabilitation Act."131 "Because the language of the two statutes is substantially the
same... [t]he legislative history of the ADA indicates that Congress intended judicial
interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act be incorporated by reference when interpreting
the ADA.'
13 2
This analysis must be viewed with caution in light of the United States Supreme
Court's ruling in Toyota Motors I, where the Court noted that while the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare was expressly granted regulating authority under Section
504, the EEOC was not granted similar authority to promulgate regulations interpreting
126 Id. at *28 (quoting Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)).
127 Id. at * 1. The Court also held that Spychalsky's evidence was insufficient to overcome a motion for
summary judgment on his ADA claim of having a record of a substantially limiting impairment or being
discriminated against based on being regarded as having a disability.
128 Spychalsky, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at * 19 (citing Rodriguez v. City of New York, 197 F.3d 611, 618
(2d Cir. 1999)).
129 Zukle v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999).
130 Id.
131 Id. (quoting Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624 (1998)).
132 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted)
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the term "disability" in the ADA. 133 Accordingly, the Court stated, the persuasive
authority of the EEOC regulations is "less clear."'
134
One significant distinction is that under Section 504, a claimant must prove that
his disability was the "sole" reason for the alleged improper discrimination. 135 This
requirement puts an increased burden on a claimant when compared to the requirements
of the ADA, which only require a showing that the disability was a "motivating factor in
the discrimination."'
136
Other important distinctions between the two statutes concern the remedies
available to claimants. Section 504 provides the same remedies that are available under
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (hereinafter "Title VI"). 137 While Title VI is
silent concerning the availability of a private cause of action for monetary damages, it is
well settled that such a remedy is available for intentional violations of Title VI and, by
analogy, is also available under the Rehabilitation Act.
138
Title II of the ADA likewise provides for monetary damages for violations. In the
case of Board of Trustees of the University ofAlabama v. Garrett, 139 however, the United
States Supreme Court held that the grant of sovereign immunity contained in the
Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution protects states from claims for
monetary damages under Title I of the ADA.140 The Supreme Court left open in Garrett
the question of Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title II and specifically noted that
133 Toyota Motors, 534 U.S. at 194.
134 Id.
135 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000). See also Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Sci. Ctr., 280 F.3d 98, 112 (2d Cir.
2001); Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1028 (8th Cir. 1999).
136 Spychalsky, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at * 19.
137 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6(b) (2000).
13' Garcia, 280 F.3d at 111-12.
139 Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
140 Id. at 374, n.9.
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"[w]e are not disposed to decide the constitutional issue whether Title II, which has
somewhat different remedial provisions from Title I, is appropriate legislation under § 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment."'
141
In Garcia v. S. U.N. Y Health Science Center,142 the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, relying on Garrett, struck down claims for monetary damages against state
actors under Title II of the ADA, where claims of discrimination were based on
"deliberate indifference."' 143 The Garcia Court held that Title II claims for monetary
damages against state actors must be based on "proof of discriminatory animus or ill
will.'
144
The Garcia Court noted that Title II claims for monetary damages against local
governmental agencies can still be brought based on a showing of "deliberate
indifference" because local governmental agencies do not enjoy Eleventh Amendment
immunity. 145 Furthermore, the Court held that its decision did not bar actions against state
actors under Title II which sought injunctive relief for claims based on "deliberate
indifference."'
146
The United States Supreme Court examined the Eleventh Amendment immunity
issue as it applied to Title II in Tennessee v. Lane. 147 In Lane, a sharply divided Court
held that Congress, in enacting Title II, appropriately exercised its power under section 5
141 Id. at 360, n. 1.
142 Garcia, 280 F. 3d 98.
14
3 Id. at 114.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
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of the Fourteenth Amendment to waive states' Eleventh Amendment immunity where the
constitutional violation implicated the accessibility of judicial services. 148
The Supreme Court is still defining the limits of Eleventh Amendment immunity
as it applies to Title II actions. The Court recently accepted certiorari and consolidated
the cases of United States v. Georgia149 and Goodman v. Georgia150 to determine whether
a state was immune from a prisoner's Title II claim of discrimination due to alleged
inadequately accessible prison housing.
Title III of the ADA incorporates the remedies which are contained in 42 U.S.C.
section 2000a-3(a).151 Monetary damages are not available to private litigants under that
section.
152
II.
THE OTHERWISE QUALIFIED VS. ESSENTIAL FUNCTION DILEMMA
'I know what you're thinking about,' said Tweedledum:
'but it isn't so, no how.'
'Contrariwise,' continued Tweedledee, 'if it was so, it
might be; and if it were so, it would be; but as it isn't, it
ain't. That's logic.'
'I was thinking,' Alice said very politely, 'which is the best
way out of this wood: it's getting so dark. Would you tell
me, please?'
But the fat little men only looked at each other and
grinned. 1
53
141 Id. at 531.
149 United States v. Georgia, 125 S. Ct. 2256 (2005).
150 Goodman v. Ray, 120 Fed. Appx. 785 (1 1th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S.Ct. 2266 (2005)
(consolidated with United States v. Georgia, 125 S. Ct. 2256 (2005)).
151 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1) (2000).
152 See Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-02 (1968); Spychalsky, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS, at *15.
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Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified
individual with a disability... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded
from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. .. 154 The United
States Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College v. Davis155 noted that this
mandate could not be followed literally because it would prevent any institution from
taking any adverse action against a handicapped individual.' 56 The Court noted that the
regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare stated that
a qualified handicapped person is "[with] respect to post secondary and vocational
education services, a handicapped person who meets the academic and technical
standards requisite to admission or participation in the [school's] education program or
activity." 157 "The term 'technical standards' refers to all nonacademic admission
criteria."158
The Supreme Court also noted that the implementing regulations contained a
statement in the appendix which expressed the Department's intention as follows:
"[u]nder such a literal reading, a blind person possessing all the qualifications for driving
a bus except sight could be said to be 'otherwise qualified' for the job of driving. Clearly,
such a result was not intended by Congress."'159 The Court concluded, therefore, that
"neither the language, purpose, nor history of section 504 reveals an intent to impose an
153 CARROLL, supra note 2, at 144.
154 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
155 Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
156 Id. at 406.
157 Id.; 45 C.F.R. §84.3(k)(3) (1978).
158 Davis, 442 U.S. at 406 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(3), pt. 84 App. A, p. 4 0 5 (1978)).
159 Id. at 407 (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(k)(3), pt. 84 App. A, p. 405 (1978)).
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affirmative-action obligation on all recipients of federal funds."' 160 In addition, the Court
noted that "[s]ection 504 imposes no requirement upon an educational institution to lower
or to effect modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped person."'
16 1
Six years later, the Supreme Court revisited this issue in Alexander v. Choate.1
62
The Supreme Court acknowledged that its use of the term "affirmative action" had led to
much criticism for failing to differentiate between affirmative action and reasonable
accommodations. 16 It noted that "the former is said to refer to a remedial policy for the
victims of past discrimination, while the latter relates to the elimination of existing
obstacles against the handicapped.', 164 The Court found in Alexander that "affirmative
action," as used in Davis, referred to "'changes,' 'adjustments' or 'modifications' which
were 'substantial"' or which would constitute "fundamental alteration[s] in the nature of
a program. ."165 when compared to "those changes that would be reasonable
accommodations." 166
Accordingly, the Court commented that:
The regulations implementing § 504 are consistent with the
view that reasonable adjustments in the nature of the
benefit offered must at times be made to assure meaningful
access. See, e.g., . . . 45 CFR § 84.44(a)(1984) (requiring
certain modifications to the regular academic programs of
secondary education institutions, such as changes in the
length of time permitted for the completion of degree
requirements, substitution of specific courses required for
the completion of degree requirements, and adaptation of
the manner in which specific courses are conducted). 167
160 Id. at 411.
161 Id. at 413.
162 Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
163 Id. at 301 n.20.
164 Id.
165 Id. (internal citations omitted).
166 Id.
167 Id. at301 n.21.
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The Supreme Court again examined the "otherwise qualified" question in School
Board of Nassau County v. Arline. 168 In Arline, a school district fired a teacher who had a
relapse of active tuberculosis. 169 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit held that she was protected by Section 504.170 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and remanding the case, holding that a person with a contagious disease can be
handicapped within the meaning of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 171
The Supreme Court further held that in order to determine whether the teacher
was "otherwise qualified," the District Court:
[would] need to conduct an individualized inquiry and
make appropriate findings of fact. Such an inquiry is
essential if § 504 is to achieve its goal of protecting
handicapped individuals from deprivations based on
prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded fear, while giving
appropriate weight to such legitimate concerns of grantees
as avoiding exposing others to significant health and safety
risks.
172
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Zukle v. The
Regents of the University of California173 determined that Davis and Alexander made it
"clear that an educational institution is not required to make fundamental or substantial
modifications to its programs or standards; it need only make reasonable ones." 174 The
Davis court noted that a program receiving federal financial assistance may violate
168 Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
169 Id.
170 Arline v. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County, 772 F.2d 759 (1 th Cir. 1985).
171 Arline, 480 U.S. at 289.
172 Id. at 287.
173 Zukle v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 1999).
174 Id. at 1046 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985)).
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Section 504 if it refuses to make modifications to its educational program which would
not entail undue financial or administrative burden. 1
75
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Nathanson v. The
Medical College of Pennsylvania176 noted that federal regulations required consideration
of the following factors in order to determine whether an accommodation would create an
undue hardship:
(1) The overall size of the recipient's program with respect
to the number of employees, number and type of
facilities, and size of budget;
(2) The type of the recipient's operation, including the
composition and structure of the recipient's workforce;
and
(3) The nature and cost of the accommodation needed.177
The Nathanson Court stated this determination must be made on a case-by-case basis.
178
The First Circuit echoed this sentiment when it found that "what is reasonable in a
particular situation may not be reasonable in a different situation - even if the situational
differences are relatively slight." 17
9
Such case-by-case evaluations have led courts to conclude that: an optometry
college need not modify or eliminate a program requirement which mandates the ability
to use certain clinical instruments for a student suffering from retinitis pigmentosa, even
though those requirements were put in place after the student enrolled in the program;
80
a law school need not eliminate the graduation requirement of completion of the taxation
175 Se. Cmty. Coll. V. Davis,, 442 U.S. 397, 412-13 (1979).
176 Nathanson v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368 (3d Cir. 1991).
177 Id. at 1386 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(c)(1)-(3) (1990)).
17 Id. at 1385.
179 Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 795 (1st Cir. 1992).
180 Doherty v. S. Coll. of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 575 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 810 (1989).
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course for a student claiming computational and other learning disabilities;181 a medical
school need not modify its clinical training schedule by giving a student with a reading
disability eight weeks between clerkships in order to study and prepare for the clinic
rotations; 182 a law school need not allow a disabled student to take a part-time course load
where the school only offered a full-time program, even though the American Bar
Association authorizes law schools to have part-time programs for the study of law;183 a
medical school was not required to allow a dyslexic student to provide supplemental oral
answers to multiple choice tests; 184 a high school athletic association was not required to
waive its age limitations for participation in sports programs for a learning disabled
student; 185 a university was not required to waive its foreign language requirement for
students with learning disabilities; 186 a medical school did not discriminate against a
student with an obsessive-compulsive disorder who was dismissed after twice failing his
psychiatry clinic; 187 a university need not modify its nursing program's clinical
requirements for a student suffering from a non-typical pregnancy; 188 a college did not
discriminate against a learning disabled Physicians Assistant student after granting and
then withdrawing permission for the student to take his examinations orally; 189 a law
school need not give a student oral examinations; 190 a medical school need not renew the
faculty appointment of a visually impaired physician and did not need to offer the
181 Spychalsky v. Sullivan, No. CV 01-0958, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15704, *36 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2003).
182 Zukle v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 1999).
183 McGregor v. La. State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850, 859 (5th Cir. 1993).
184 Stern v. Univ. of Osteopathic Med. and Health Scis., 220 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2000).
185 Pottgen v. Mo. State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 1994).
186 Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 974 F. Supp. 106,147 (D. Mass. 1998).
187 Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017, 1029 (8th Cir. 1999). However, the court reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the University on the student's retaliation claim and
remanded the case for further action.
18' Darian v. Univ. of Mass., 980 F. Supp. 77, 91 (D. Mass. 1997).
189 DuBois v. Alderson-Broaddus Coll., Inc., 950 F. Supp. 754, 760 (N.D.W.Va. 1997).
190 Murphy v. Franklin Pierce Law Ctr., 882 F. Supp. 1176, 1182 (D.N.H. 1994).
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physician a part-time appointment; 191 a law school need not lower its 2.0 minimum grade
point average standard to accommodate a student with a central nervous system
metabolic disorder; 192 a law school need not waive minimum grade point average
requirements for a recovered alcoholic; 193 a law school did not discriminate by dismissing
and failing to readmit a student suffering from post traumatic stress disorder who
received more than nine credit hours of grades below a C- in violation of the school
academic standards; 194 and a law school did not discriminate against a visually impaired
law student by dismissing her after she failed to meet its 2.0 academic standard for
continuation in its program.195
Conversely, a summary judgment in favor of a medical school was reversed on
appeal where the school failed to give extra time between clinical rotations and then
dismissed a student with a verbal processing disorder who had repeatedly failed various
clinical programs; 196 a university was denied summary judgment where it dismissed a
pastoral psychology student who was hospitalized with clinical depression; 197 a state
board of bar examiners was ordered to allow a dyslexic applicant to take the bar
examination using twice the normal time, the use of a computer, permission to circle
multiple choice examination questions in the examination booklet and the use of
examinations with enlarged print;198 and a testing agency was ordered to give a test-taker
191 Hong v. Temple Univ., 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 7301, *20-23 (E.D.Pa. 2000).
192 Aloia v. N.Y. Law Sch., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7769, *23-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
193 Anderson v. Univ. of Wis., 665 F. Supp. 1372 (W.D.Wisc. 1987).
194 Gill v. Franklin Pierce Law Ctr., 899 F. Supp. 850, 854-56 (D.N.H. 1995).
'95 Murphy, 882 F. Supp. at 1177-82 (D.N.H. 1994).
196 Wong v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 807, 821 (9th Cir. 1999).
197 Carlin v. Trs. of Boston Univ., 907 F. Supp. 509, 511 (D. Mass. 1995).
198 Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam'rs, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11926, * 147-48 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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who suffered from an "expressive writing disorder" fifty percent additional time and a
quiet room in which to take the Law School Admissions Test.
199
An in-depth reading of the above decisions demonstrates that both institutions and
the courts have struggled while attempting to resolve "the otherwise qualified vs.
essential function dilemma." 200 Some courts have issued conflicting decisions within the
same year in almost identical cases.20 1 The distinction in the outcome in these cases, if
any, appears to be the extent to which the individual institutions have documented their
efforts to justify what constituted "fundamental" program requirements as well as to
justify the extent to which "reasonable" accommodations could be granted without
changing the fundamental nature of their academic programs. To the extent that
institutions could do so, the courts appear willing to defer to academic decision-makers.
III.
ACADEMIC DEFERENCE AND ITS LIMITS
Everything was happening so oddly that she didn't feel a bit surprised at
finding the Red Queen and the White Queen sitting close to her, one on
each side: she would have like very much to ask them how they came
there, but she feared it would not be quite civil. However, there would be
no harm, she thought, in asking if the game was over. "Please, would you
tell me -" she began, looking timidly at the Red Queen.
"Speak when you're spoken to!" The Queen sharply interrupted her.202
199 Rothberg v. Law Sch. Admission Council, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1098, 1107 (D.C. Col. 2004).
200 See discussion supra Part II.
201 Compare Zukle, 166 F.3d at 1042-44 (upholding summary judgment in favor of the University of
California on a Rehabilitation and ADA claim filed by a medical student who alleged that the University
failed to allow her to retake certain courses and clinical courses after repeated failure), with Wong I, 192
F.3d at 8 11-15 (reversing summary judgment in favor of the medical school under almost identical
circumstances, only seven months later).
202 CARROLL, supra note 2, at 192.
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In Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, the United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of deference to academic decision-makers in the case
of a student who had been dismissed from medical school for failure to meet the school's
academic requirements in her clinical education program.2 03 Horowitz alleged that she
was dismissed without being afforded procedural due process, in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 204 While the case does not
concern a claim under Section 504 or under the ADA, it is nevertheless instructive of the
Supreme Court's evolving deference to academic decision-makers.
In Horowitz, the Supreme Court noted that the student did not have a recognized
property right in her medical school education.205 It deferred a decision concerning
whether she had a liberty interest in continuing her medical education. 20 6 Instead,
without deciding that such an interest existed, the Court concluded that she had been
afforded the appropriate due process in her dismissal.20 7
In reaching this decision, the Court addressed the role of the courts in the
academic decision making process. The Court noted that whether a student is making
sufficient academic progress or whether the student should be dismissed from an
academic program is akin to the "decision of an individual professor as to the proper
grade for a student in his course." 20 8 Additionally, the Court held that "[t]he
determination whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert
203 Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 79, 84-85 (1978).
204 Id. at 79-80.
205 Id. at 82.
206 Id. at 84.
207 Id. at 85.
208 Id at 90.
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evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of
judicial or administrative decisionmaking [sic]." 209
The Horowitz Court "decline[d] to further enlarge the judicial presence in the
academic community and thereby risk deterioration of many beneficial aspects of the
faculty-student relationship" 210 and concluded that "[c]ourts are particularly ill-equipped
to evaluate academic performance."
211
In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, the Supreme Court addressed the
issue of whether Section 504 required an academic institution to modify its educational
program to admit a handicapped student.212 Ms. Davis suffered from a severe hearing
loss which required her to read lips in order to understand what people said.213 The
nursing program at Southeastern Community College refused to admit her due to her
inability to understand verbal communication. 2 14 It also refused her request to modify the
nursing program to eliminate the clinical portion of her training.
215
Without directly addressing the issue of deference to academic decisions, the
Court held that the college was not required to make fundamental modifications in its
nursing program to accommodate Ms. Davis.2 16 The Court noted that "Southeastern's
program, structured to train persons who will be able to perform all normal roles of a
registered nurse, represents a legitimate academic policy." 217 The Court stated that
Section 504 does not impose an obligation on colleges to "lower or to effect substantial
209 Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90.
210 id.
211 Id. at 91.
212 Se. Cmty. Coll. v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 400 (1979).
213 Id. at 400-01.
214 Id. at 401-02.
215 Id. at 409-10.
216 Id. at 410.
217 Id. at413 n.12.
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modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped person." 218 Finally, the Court
noted that "there was no violation of § 504 when Southeastern concluded that respondent
did not qualify for admission to its program." 219 Thus the Court deferred, in effect, to the
college's academic decision making concerning admission to its nursing program.
The Supreme Court revisited the academic deference issue in Regents of the
University of Michigan v. Ewing. 22 Ewing had been admitted to the University's
Inteflex program, a program which at the time, allowed graduation from college and
medical school in six years.22 1 Almost immediately, Ewing faced difficulty with the
program and had to repeat several courses. 222 Eventually, Ewing managed to complete
the first four years of the program and took the National Board of Medical Examiners
Part I test (hereinafter NBME Part I); passage of which was essential to continuing in the
clinical portion of the program.223 Ewing failed the NBME Part I, obtaining the lowest
grade in the history of the Inteflex program at the University of Michigan.224 The
University dismissed Ewing from the program and, despite several appeals, refused to
readmit him or to let him retake NBME Part 1.225
Ewing filed suit alleging various causes of action, including a violation of his
substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. 226 After conducting a
trial, the district court found that Ewing's due process rights had not been violated by the
218 Davis, 442 U.S. at 413.
219 Id. at 414 (emphasis added).
220 474 U.S. 214 (1985).
221 Id. at 215.
222 Id. at 217-18 (quoting Ewing v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 559 F. Supp. 791, 793 (E.D.
Mich. 1983)).
223 Id. at 215-16.
224 Id. at 216.
225 Id. at 216-17.
226 Ewing, 474 U.S. at 217.
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University. 227 In reversing the district court's judgment, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found that there was a constitutional violation and ordered
the University to allow Ewing to retake the NBME Part I and to reinstate him if he passed
the test.228 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the decision of the Sixth
Circuit.
229
In its decision, the Supreme Court again examined the issue of deference to
academic decision-makers. The Supreme Court stated that
[w]hen judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic
decision, such as this one, they should show great respect for the faculty's
professional judgment. Plainly, they may not override it unless it is such a
substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate
that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise
professional judgment.2 3 0
The Supreme Court also noted a concern about treading on the "academic
freedom" safeguards contained in the First Amendment.23 1 It stated that "[d]iscretion to
determine, on academic grounds, who may be admitted to study, has been described as
one of the 'four essential academic freedoms' of a university. "
232
In Wynne v. Tufts University School of Medicine, the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit considered the extent to which a medical school must alter
its program of instruction to provide reasonable accommodations to a learning-disabled
student. 3 Wynne was allowed to enter Tufts Medical School under its affirmative
227 Id. at 220; see Ewing, 559 F. Supp. at 799, for the district court's analysis of why Ewing's due process
rights had not been violated by the University.
221 Ewing, 474 U.S. at 221; see also Ewing v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 742 F.2d 913, 916 (6th
Cir. 1984) (discussing the test that the court applied in finding the constitutional violation).
229 Ewing, 474 U.S. at 228.
230 Id. at 225 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)).
231 Id. at 226 (quoting Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967)).
232 Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978)).
233 Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 932 F.2d 19, 20 (1st Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Wynne l.
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action program for minority applicants even though his Medical College Aptitude Test
(MCAT) score and undergraduate grade point average were lower than most Tufts
234 235students. 4 During his first year in school he failed eight of his fifteen courses. Even
though the program guidelines provide for dismissal after five failures, the dean allowed
236Wynne to repeat the first-year program.
Prior to repeating the first-year program, Wynne underwent neuropsychological
testing that determined profiles like his own had been identified in the learning-disabled
population.23 7 After the testing, he reentered medical school and was provided
accommodations which included counseling, tutors, note-takers and taped lectures.
238
Nevertheless, Wynne failed two courses his second year, Pharmacology and
Biochemistry. 239 He was allowed to retake these exams and passed Pharmacology but
again failed Biochemistry. 24 At this time, he was formally dismissed from the medical
school.241
Wynne filed suit alleging a violation of Section 504 based on Tufts' failure to
allow him to take oral final exams.242 The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of Tufts and Wynne subsequently appealed.243 A panel of the First Circuit reversed
the district court's holding, stating that Tufts had failed to show that it did not have a duty
under Section 504 to accommodate Wynne's special needs.
24 4
234 Id. at 21.
235 Id.
236 Id.
237 Id.
238 Id.
239 Wynnel, 932 F.2d at 21.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 22.
242 Id. at 20, 22.
243 Id. at 20.
244 Id. at 20.
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The First Circuit granted rehearing en banc and examined the nature of the
obligations of educational institutions under Section 504.245 The Court noted that Ewing
held that, in reviewing academic decisions, courts must "show great respect for the
faculty's professional judgment."246 Furthermore, when courts review the "otherwise
qualified-reasonable accommodations" requirement of Section 504, they must show the
proper deference to academic decisions with two qualifications:
First, as we have noted, there is a real obligation on the
academic institution to seek suitable means of reasonably accommodating
a handicapped person and to submit a factual record indicating that it
conscientiously carried out this statutory obligation. Second, the Ewing
formulation, hinging judicial override on "a substantial departure from
accepted academic norms," is not necessarily a helpful test in assessing
whether professional judgment has been exercised in exploring reasonable
alternatives for accommodating a handicapped person.
247
Accordingly, the Court looked to an analysis similar to the process of determining
the applicability of qualified immunity for governmental decision-makers. 248 The Court
created the following test for use in reviewing academic decisions:
If the institution submits undisputed facts demonstrating that the relevant
officials within the institution considered alternative means, their
feasibility, cost and effect on the academic program, and came to a
rationally justifiable conclusion that the available alternatives would result
either in lowering academic standards or requiring substantial program
alteration, the court could rule as a matter of law that the institution had
met its duty of seeking reasonable accommodation.
249
The Court remanded the case to the District Court for a determination of whether
Tufts met its burden concerning the denial of the requested accommodation. 250 On
245 Wynne I, 932 F.2d at 21.
246 Id. at 25 (quoting Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225).
247 Id. at 25-26.
2481d. at 26.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 29.
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remand, the district court again granted Tufts' motion for summary judgment and Wynne
appealed to the First Circuit.
251
The First Circuit, on appeal, concluded that it would not second guess the
academic decision made by the Tufts faculty.
252
[T]he point is not whether a medical school is "right" or "wrong" in
making program-related decisions. Such absolutes rarely apply in the
context of subjective decision-making, particularly in a scholastic setting.
The point is that Tufts, after undertaking a diligent assessment of the
available options, felt itself obliged to make "a professional, academic
judgment that [a] reasonable accommodation [was] simply not
available. ",2
53
Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of
Tufts.
2 54
Other courts have added important caveats to the above standards. The Third
Circuit implied that stringent admission standards may be entitled to more deference if
they were designed to "protect public health and safety, a concern that has been given
considerable deference by the courts." 255 Similarly, the Sixth Circuit noted that, "[s]urely
the law does not require that a handicapped person be accommodated by waiver of a
requirement when his failure to meet the requirement poses potential danger to the
public." 2
56
The Eighth Circuit declined to decide whether academic institutions, like
employers, are required under the ADA to engage in an interactive process with students
251 Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 793 (1st Cir. 1992) [hereinafter Wynne 11].
252 Id at 794.
253 Id. at 795 (quoting Wynne I, 932 F.2d at 27-28).
254 Id at 796.
255 Nathanson v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 926 F.2d 1268, 1384 (3rd Cir. 1990) (citing Judith Welsh Wegner, The
Antidiscrimination Model Reconsidered. Enshrining Equal Opportunity Without Respect to Handicap
Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 401, 476-78 (1984)).
256 Doherty v. S. Coll. of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 575 (6th Cir. 1988) (quoting Doherty v. S. Coll. of
Optometry, 659 F. Supp. 662, 673 (W.D. Tenn. 1987)).
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to determine whether reasonable accommodations can be found for their disability.257
The Fourth Circuit, meanwhile, noted that a university's academic decisions were entitled
to less deference and were reviewable by courts where the university determined that a
student was entitled to extra time on examinations but expelled the student from school
based, in part, on grades which were obtained by the student before the accommodation
was granted.258
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the First Circuit that "a court's duty is to first find
the basic facts, giving due deference to the school, and then to evaluate whether those
facts add up to a professional, academic judgment that reasonable accommodation is
simply not available." 259 However, the court cautioned that "extending deference to
educational institutions must not impede our obligation to enforce the ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act. Thus we must be careful not to allow academic decisions to disguise
truly discriminatory requirements. "
260
Seven months later, in a strikingly similar case, the court affirmed its duty to
beware of abuse of this deference, specifically noting the importance that the courts,
"ensure that educational institutions are not 'disguis[ing] truly discriminatory
requirements' as academic decisions; to this end, '[t]he educational institution has a real
obligation.. .to seek suitable means of reasonably accommodating a handicapped person
and to submit a factual record indicating that it conscientiously carried out this statutory
obligation. "
261
257 See Fjellstad v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 188 F.3d 944, 952 (8th Cir. 1999); Stern v. Univ. of Osteopathic
Med. and Health Sciences, 220 F.3d 906, 909 (8th Cir. 2000).
25' Betts v. The Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23105 (4th Cir. 1999).
259 Zukle v. The Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 166 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting Wynne I, 932
F.2d at 27-28).
260 
gd.261 Won , 192 F.3d at 817 (quoting Zukle, 166 F.3d at 1048) (emphasis omitted).
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The Court held that:
Subsumed within this standard is the institution's duty to make itself aware
of the nature of the student's disability; to explore alternatives for
accommodating the student; and to exercise professional judgment in
deciding whether the modifications under consideration would give the
student the opportunity to complete the program without fundamentally or
substantially modifying the school's standards.
262
To this end, the Wong Court concluded that institutions must meet certain
standards and must be able to show that they met these standards. 263 For example, these
institutions will need to "submit undisputed facts showing that relevant officials
considered alternative means, their feasibility, [and] cost and effect on the academic
program." 264 Additionally, courts should refuse to defer to academic decisions, "when
institutions present no evidence regarding who took part in the decision" or when "simple
conclusory averments of [the] head of [an] institution" is all that is offered to support a
"deferential standard of review."
265
Finally, the Fifth Circuit determined that while courts must defer to academic
decisions which are devoid of evidence of either malice or ill-will, courts need not give
deference to the American Bar Association standard for accrediting law schools when a
court considers what accommodations are reasonable and required under Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act.
266
The primary lesson of these cases is that the courts will not interfere with
academic operations as long as institutions can document that a deliberative process was
262 Id. at 818.
263 Id.
264 Id. (quoting Wynne I, 932 F.2d at 26) (internal quotations omitted).
265 Id. (quoting Wynne 1, 932 F.2d at 28) (internal quotations omitted).
266 McGregor v. La. State Univ. Bd. of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850, 859 (5th Cir. 1993).
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undertaken to determine whether a program requirement was truly fundamental. 267 So
long as such a deliberative process is in place, the courts will not second guess academic
decision-makers. 268 In other words, the courts will not try to decide whether the
institutions' decisions were "right or wrong."
269
Unfortunately, this excessive deference to academic decision-makers can
sometimes result in courts not enforcing Congressional mandates to eliminate
discrimination in academic programs where reasonable accommodations could allow
disabled students to successfully compete in and complete academic programs. The
courts must be vigilant to ensure that explanations offered by academic institutions were
not created in hindsight to justify their discrimination against disabled students, but are
truly reflective of important fundamental program requirements which cannot be altered
to provide reasonable accommodation.
IV.
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: ALICE'S JOURNEYS THROUGH THE
WORLD OF ACADEMIC ACCOMMODATIONS AND THE STRANGE
CREATURES SHE MET.
"Where do you come from?" said the Red Queen. "And where are you
going? Look up, speak nicely, and don't twiddle your fingers all the
time."
267 See supra text accompanying notes 220-34.
268 See Zukle, 166 F.3d at 1048 ("once an educational institution has fulfilled this obligation however, we
will defer to its academic decisions"); see also Wynne I, 932 F.2d at 25-26 ("[T]here is a real obligation on
the academic institution to seek suitable means of reasonably accommodating a handicapped person and to
submit a factual record indicating that it conscientiously carried out this statutory obligation.").
269 Wynne H, 976 F.2d at 795.
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Alice attended to all these directions, and explained, as well as she could,
that she had lost her way.
"I don't know what you mean by YOUR way," said the Queen: "all the
ways about here belong to ME -- but why did you come out here at all?"
she added in a kinder tone. "Curtsey while you're thinking what to say, it
saves time."
270
The Red Queen
Carlin v. Trustees of Boston University27 1
Marie Carlin entered Boston University's Doctor of Philosophy program in
pastoral psychology in September of 1987.272 The program consisted of four semesters
of academic general research followed by a two-year clinical component. 273 Ms. Carlin
completed the first year of the program and was awarded a fellowship from Boston
University to attend the Danielson Institute for Pastoral Counseling to complete the two-
year clinical portion of the doctoral program.274 She completed the first year of the
Danielson fellowship training and in May of 1989, she received a certificate stating that
she had successfully completed the first-year clinical requirement.
275
Throughout her enrollment in the doctoral program, Ms. Carlin had been suffering
from depression.276 Due to the worsening of her condition in the spring of 1989, she
requested and was granted a leave of absence from Boston University to last for one
year.277 In April of 1990, her condition deteriorated so much that she was admitted to a
270 CARROLL, supra note 2, at 124.
271 907 F. Supp. 509 (D. Mass. 1995).
272 Id. at 510.
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id.
27 6 Id.
277 Carlin, 907 F. Supp. at 510.
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psychiatric hospital where she remained under treatment until February of 1991.278 She
requested and was granted an extension of her leave of absence for an additional year.
279
Ms. Carlin wrote to her academic advisor in June of 1991, informing him that she
was ready to return to the doctoral program.280 She sent copies of the letter to both the
Dean of Boston University and to the Director of the Danielson Institute.281 She received
a response in August of the same year, indicating that the faculty had decided not to
readmit her into the program. 282 Ms. Carlin responded by filing suit in the United States
District Court alleging that the University had violated Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act.2
83
Boston University filed a motion for summary judgment, stating that the decision
to terminate Ms. Carlin's participation in the program was based on the academic
determination of the faculty and asserting that their determination was entitled to
deference by the court.2 8 4 The court agreed that it was required to defer to the
institution's decision "if there [was] evidence that the University made a 'professional
academic judgment that [a] reasonable accommodation [was] simply not available." 285
Ms. Carlin responded to the University's motion by submitting evidence that:
(1) there was no documentation of lack of ability until after she took an
approved leave of absence;
(2) her clinical supervisor wrote a letter stating that she demonstrated good
clinical skills;
278 Id.
279 Id.
280 Id.
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Carlin, 907 F. Supp. at 510.
284 Id. at 511.
285 Id. at 510, (citing Wynne 1, 932 F.2d at 27-28).
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(3) she received a certificate stating that she had successfully completed the
first year clinical program;
(4) she was not terminated at the end of the first clinical year but was
allowed to go on a leave of absence;
(5) she was not terminated from the program until she attempted to return
from an approved leave of absence after her discharge from the
psychiatric hospital; and
(6) her academic supervisor wrote a letter stating that the reason for her
termination from the program was "her history of serious mental health
problems."
286
The Court denied the University's motion for summary judgment stating that Ms.
Carlin presented "significant probative evidence of pretext." 287 The Court noted:
The evidence set forth above suggests that the reason articulated by
defendants for terminating plaintiff was untrue and that the defendants
were in fact motivated by plaintiffs mental illness and not her lack of
aptitude in its decision to terminate her from the program. Boston
University has absolute authority to render an academic judgment, but that
decision must be a genuine one.
288
Humpty Dumpty
Guckenberger v. Boston University
2 89
Boston University is one of the largest private universities in the country. 290 Its
liberal arts curriculum has long required that students complete four semesters of a
286 Id at 511.
287 Id.
288 Id.
289 974 F. Supp. 106 (D. Mass. 1997)[hereinafter Guckenberger ].
29 0Id. at 116.
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foreign language as a condition for graduation. 291 The University was also recognized,
prior to 1995, as being among the leading academic institutions in proactively addressing
the needs of its learning disabled students. 292 The University created the Learning
Disabilities Support Services ("LDSS"), which was staffed by trained professionals to
evaluate and provide accommodations for students. 293 It was often described as a "model
program".
294
Prior to 1995, LDSS provided accommodations to learning disabled students
which included note-takers, tape-recorded text books, extra time on final exams and
course substitutions, as well as alternate courses in lieu of the University's foreign
language requirement. 29 5 LDSS conferred with the heads of various academic
departments at the College of Liberal Arts and had developed an approved list of courses
to substitute for the foreign language curriculum for learning disabled students. 296 LDSS
had not, however, sought the approval of the course substitutions from the President,
Provost or central administration at Boston University.
297
In the spring of 1995, Boston University's then-Provost and later President, Jon
Westling, discovered that LDSS had been allowing learning disabled students to
substitute non-language courses in place of the foreign language requirement.
298
Westling had no graduate degrees of any kind and no formal academic training in any
aspect of learning disabilities.
299
291 Id.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Guckenberger I, 974 F. Supp. at 116.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 117.
299 Id.
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Westling was, in the words of the Court, "chagrined" to make this discovery
regarding the waiver of the language requirement. 300 Westling instructed his assistant,
Craig Klafter, to conduct an investigation into the matter. 30 1 As a result of this
investigation, Klafter confronted Loring Brickerhoff, the director of LDSS, and
demanded proof that learning disabilities prevented students from successfully
completing foreign language courses. 302 Brickerhoff referred Klafter to Brickerhoff s
book on the subject. 30 3 Klafter, who did have a Ph. D. in Modern History, but no
experience in the area of learning disabilities, reported to Westling that there was "no
scientific proof that the existence of a learning disability ... prevents the successful study
of... [a] foreign language."
30 4
Westling informed Norman Johnson, the Vice-President and Dean of Students,
that Boston University was to "cease granting course substitutions effective
immediately. '" 30 5 Westling also ordered that all accommodation letters generated by
LDSS were to be forwarded to his office for approval before they were sent to students or
faculty. 30 6 Westling made this decision without consulting any experts or members of the
faculty concerning the importance of the foreign language requirement in a liberal arts
curriculum. 30 7 The court's opinion stated that the course substitution issue had become a
"bee in his academic bonnet." 30 8 The court noted that "Westling decided to become
personally involved with the accommodations evaluation process, even though he had no
300 Id.
301 Guckenberger I, 974 F. Supp. at 117.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 Id. at 177-18.
306 Guckenberger 1, 974 F. Supp. at 118.
307 Id.308 Id. at 118 (internal quotations omitted).
Winter 2006
Richmond Journal of Law and the Public Interest
expertise or experience in diagnosing learning disabilities or in fashioning appropriate
accommodations."
30 9
During the time Westling became involved in this process, he "began delivering
speeches denouncing the zealous advocacy of the learning disabilities movement." 310 In
the speeches, Westling "accused learning-disabilities advocates of fashioning 'fugitive'
impairments that are not supported in the scientific or medical literature." 311 The district
court identified a dominant theme running throughout the speeches: Westling believed
that "the learning disability movement is a great mortuary for the ethics of hard work,
individual responsibility, and pursuit of excellence.... ,312 In July 1995, Westling
delivered a speech in which he described how a shy woman approached him on the first
day of class and presented a letter containing a diagnosis of her learning disability and
requesting certain accommodations: extra time on exams, copies of lecture notes, and a
separate exam room. The letter continued, requesting that, should this young woman fall
asleep in class, he should be "particularly concerned to fill her in on any material she
missed while dozing." 313 He named this student, "Somnolent Samantha.,
314
During the trial before the district court, Westling admitted he had fabricated
Samantha in order to illustrate his point. 315 He further admitted that, "that such a student
never existed ... [and] that his description of her did not even represent a prototype of
the learning-disabled students he had encountered.,
316
309 Id.
310 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
311 Guckenberger, 974 F. Supp. at 118.
312 Id.
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 Id.
316 Id.
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By the Fall 1995 semester, Boston University was at a "bureaucratic impasse." 317
Brickerhoff at LDSS ignored Westling's order and continued to grant accommodations
without Westling's approval. 318 As a result of his mandates being disregarded, an "irate"
Westling demanded "that all accommodations letters that LDSS had prepared but that had
not yet been picked up by the affected students be delivered to his office." 319 Westling
and his office staff then undertook to review all the approved accommodations even
though neither Westling nor his staff had any training in the field.320 Westling then
ordered Brickerhoff to deny the majority of the requests and to immediately implement
Westling's changes in the LDSS procedures.
321
On December 4, 1995 Brickerhoff sent a letter to all Boston University students
who were receiving accommodations and informed them that they needed to renew their
documentation and resubmit their request for accommodations for any previous diagnosis
that was more than three years old.32 2 Such documentation would need to contain a
report by a licensed psychologist, psychiatrist or physician in order to comply with
Westling's standards.
323
The result, as described by the court in its opinion, was "chaos." 324 In early 1996,
Brickerhoff and several members of the disability services staff resigned.325 Westling
hired an adjunct law professor to take over the LDSS office. 326 The new head of the
LDSS office undertook the review of all the accommodation files even though "the
317 Guckenberger 1, 974 F. Supp. at 119.
318 Id.
319 id.
320 Id.
321 Id. at 120 (listing Westling's instructions for change).
322 Id.
323 Guckenberger I, 974 F. Supp. at 120.
324 Id.
325 Id. at 121 (explaining that the LDSS office was "virtually unstaffed").
326 Id.
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student files were in complete disarray.., and neither he nor any other newly-hired DS
staff members had any expertise in diagnosing learning disabilities or in fashioning
appropriate accommodations. " 327 The remainder of the new LDSS staff was also "hand-
picked" by Westling. 328 For instance, prior to being hired by Westling as the new
Coordinator of Disability Services, Judith Zafft had articulated to Westling that she
believed there to be "too much abuse in the granting of accommodations". 32 9 Despite the
extensive and selective new staffing, all LDSS recommendations were still forwarded to
Westling's office for final approval.330
In the midst of this "chaos," Elizabeth Guckenberger, as well as the other Boston
University students who had diagnosed learning disabilities, filed suit in the United States
District Court alleging violations of Section 794 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title III of the
ADA and various state law breach of contract claims. 331 At the end of the trial, the court
held that Boston University had violated the law in regard to certain claims. 332 It
awarded monetary damages to the students for Boston University's change in its
disability evaluation process and enjoined most of the changes.333
On the foreign language course substitution issue, however, the court noted that it
was required to give deference to the academic decision-makers, Boston University.
334
The court stated that a university is permitted to refuse to alter its programs to
accommodate disabled students if it "'undertake[s] a diligent assessment of the available
327 Id. at 121-22.
328 Id. at 122 n. 10.
329 Guckenberger , 974 F. Supp. at 122 n. 10.
330Id. at 122.
331 Id. at 114.
332 Id. at 153.
333 Id. at 153-55 ("The Court orders BU to cease and desist implementing its current policy of requiring that
students with learning disorders (not ADD or ADHD) who have current evaluations by trained
professionals with masters degrees and sufficient experience be completely retested.").
334 Id. at 149.
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options'33 . . . and makes 'a professional academic judgment that reasonable
accommodation is simply not available." 336 The court further noted that Westling's
"ipse dixit" was not sufficient to meet this burden. 337 To that end, the court held that,
Westling's reliance on discriminatory stereotypes, together with his failure
to consider carefully the effect of course substitutions on BU's liberal arts
programs and to consult with academics and experts in learning
disabilities, constitutes a failure of BU's obligation to make a rational
judgment that course substitutions would fundamentally alter the course of
study.
338
The Court then ordered Boston University to conduct, within thirty days: "a deliberative
procedure for considering whether modification of its degree requirement in foreign
language would fundamentally alter the nature of its liberal arts program." 339 Complying
with the court's order, the University decided to use the Dean's Advisory Committee to
consider the question of whether the foreign language requirement was a fundamental
component of the University's liberal arts curriculum.340 The committee, composed of
eleven members of the faculty of the Liberal Arts College, met on seven occasions. Of
these seven meetings, five meetings were closed to the public.341 No notes were taken of
the committee's deliberations until the court issued an order requiring the committee to
do so.342 The committee completed its report on December 2, 1997 which concluded that
335 Guckenberger 1, 974 F. Supp. at 149 (quoting Wynne HI, 976 F.2d at 795)(alterations in original).
336 Id. (quoting Wynne 1, 932 F.2d at 27-28)
337 Id. at 149 n.35. "According to BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004), "ipse dixit" means,
"something asserted but not proved".
338 Guckenberger I, 974 F. Supp. at 149.
339 Id. at 154.
340 Guckenberger v. Boston Univ., 8 F. Supp. 2d 82, 86 (D. Mass. 1998)[hereinafter Guckenberger I].
341 Id.
342 Id. ("[F]ollowing the court's order to do so at the October 6 hearing, minutes were kept for all but the
last of the remaining meetings.").
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"the foreign language requirement is fundamental to the nature of the liberal arts degree
at Boston University. "
343
In further proceedings regarding the committee's report, the court discussed its
obligation to show deference to the academic decision making process. 344 It held that
there was no "right" or "wrong" way to make "program-related decisions" because
"[s]uch absolutes rarely apply in the context of subjective decisionmaking [sic],
particularly in a scholastic setting." 345 In giving due deference to the school, the court
determined that it must "find the basic facts" which must include showings of "(1) an
indication of who took part in the decision [and] when it was made; (2) a discussion of
the unique qualities of the foreign language requirement as it now stands; and (3) a
consideration of the possible alternatives to the requirement.
'
"
346
The court noted that the committee had "rallied around" the foreign language
requirement. 347 Some committee members expressed the belief that it was "important to
be immersed in ancient Greek and Latin to understand Greek and Roman cultures."
348
Another member "waxed 'that someone who can read in French would realize that
Madame Bovary dies in the imperfect tense, something that we don't have in the English
language, and it makes for a very different understanding of the novel."'
349
343 Id. at 87.
344 Guckenberger II, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 87.
345 Id. at 87 (quoting Wynne II, 976 F.2d at 795).
346 Id. (quoting Wynne I, 932 F.2d at 27-28) (alterations in original) (internal quotations omitted); see also
Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287-88 (1987) (holding that courts should make
"appropriate findings of fact" and show deference").
347 Guckenberger II, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 88.
348 Id.
349 Id.
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The plaintiffs countered that the University's policy marked a "substantial
departure from accepted academic norms".350 Their evidence showed that the majority of
liberal arts colleges, including Harvard, Princeton, Yale, Columbia, Dartmouth, Cornell
and Brown do not require a foreign language, or if they do have such a requirement, they
waive the requirement for learning disabled students. 35' The plaintiffs then challenged
the committee's findings, asserting that (1) a requirement of four semesters of foreign
language is not enough for most students to master the language sufficiently to read
major works of foreign literature ("thus debunking the Madame Bovary line of argument
as involving an imperfect logic, not an imperfect tense"); (2) a foreign language
requirement provides no cultural educational benefits to students; (3) learning a foreign
language requires a particular thinking process that is distinctive from other types of
learning; and (4) the foreign language requirement does not address ethnocentrism among
students. 352 To support these arguments, the Plaintiffs presented the testimony of the
Chair of the Language and Foreign Studies Department at American University who
testified that she, along with other academics, "strongly disagree [d] with BU's
conclusions and label[ed] them as 'trite', 'idealistic' or 'cliches'" 3 Finally, the
plaintiffs criticized what they considered the committee's failure to refer to outside
experts. 35
4
The court, however, determined that its role was not to "conduct a head-count" of
what was done at other universities, and instead held that the appropriate question was
whether the University's decision is "rationally justifiable" rather than being the only
351 Id. at 89.
351 Id. at 89.
352 Guckenberger II, 8 F. Supp. 2d at 90.
353 Id.
354 Id.
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possible decision it could have reached."3 ' Ultimately, the court answered that question,
holding that the foreign language requirement was "'rationally justifiable' and represents
a professional judgment with which the Court should not interfere." 35 6
CONCLUSION
'Now! Now!' cried the Queen. 'Faster! Faster!' And they went so fast that at last
they seemed to skim through the air, hardly touching the ground with their feet,
till suddenly, just as Alice was getting quite exhausted, they stopped, and she
found herself sitting on the ground, breathless and giddy.
The Queen propped her up against a tree, and said kindly, 'You may rest a little
now.'
Alice looked round her in great surprise. 'Why, I do believe we've been under
this tree the whole time! Everything's just as it was!'
'Of course it is,' said the Queen, 'what would you have it?'
'Well, in OUR country,' said Alice, still panting a little, 'you'd generally get to
somewhere else -- if you ran very fast for a long time, as we've been doing.'
'A slow sort of country!' said the Queen. 'Now, HERE, you see, it takes all the
running YOU can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get somewhere
else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!' 151
Like Alice, many learning disabled students find that no matter how hard they attempt to
run through the bureaucratic accommodations chess board, they wind up in the same place. They
remain trapped in a country ruled by a Red Queen, a country in which they must run twice as fast
as is humanly possible if they expect to get anywhere.
355 Id. at 89.
356 Id. at 91 (holding that BU satisfied the requirements under Wynne because it "implemented a
deliberative process by which it considered in a timely manner both the importance of the foreign language
requirement... and the feasibility of the alternative") (internal quotation omitted).
357 Lewis Carroll, Alice in Wonderland 127 (Donald J. Gray ed., Norton & Co. 2d ed. 1992) (1871).
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Humpty Dumpty also survives today in the realm of academia. Decisions made by
university faculties concerning participation of learning disabled students in academic programs
are granted deference by the courts, provided that the institutions show that they engaged in a
reasoned decision-making process concerning whether requested academic accommodations
would fundamentally alter the nature of the program. 35 Courts are unwilling to consider whether
the academic decisions are right or wrong and will therefore not second guess those decisions,
provided that the institutions can show something more that an "ipse dixit" process.
Today's University President "Dumpty" seems to have amended his statement to fit into
the academic realm: "words mean just what I, and the reasoned decision of my hand-appointed
faculty committee, choose them to mean, neither more or less." 359 In today's judicial
environment such a response will ensure the insulation of his academic domain from the
intrusive mandates of the courts. That is, until the White Knight rescues Alice from the Looking
Glass World.
EPILOGUE36
0
Of all the strange things that Alice saw in her journey Through The
Looking-Glass, this was the one that she always remembered most clearly.
Years afterwards she could bring the whole scene back again, as if it had
been only yesterday--the mild blue eyes and kindly smile of the Knight--
the setting sun gleaming through his hair, and shining on his armor in a
blaze of light that quite dazzled her--the horse quietly moving about, with
the reins hanging loose on his neck, cropping the grass at her feet--and the
black shadows of the forest behind--all this she took in like a picture, as,
with one hand shading her eyes, she leant against a tree, watching the
strange pair, and listening, in a half dream, to the melancholy music of the
361song..
358 See supra notes 284-97, 304-13, 317-24 and accompanying text.
359 See generally Carroll, supra note 2 ("'When I use a word,' Humpty Dumpty said... 'It means just
what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less"').
360 THE AMERICAN COLLEGE DICTIONARY 404 (C.L. Barnhart & Jess Stern eds., 1964)("[A] speech,
usually in verse, by one of the actors after the conclusion of the play.").
361 Carroll, supra note 324, Chapter VIII.
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